Tariffs Alone Won’t Save America: How MAGA’s Isolationism Undermines Reindustrialisation, Friend-Shoring, and the Real China Strategy
Trump sparked the right debate on China, but his tariff-first, ally-last approach ignores the modern industrial playbook. Rebuilding America means working with partners - not pushing them away.
Introduction
The MAGA movement (Make America Great Again) has made re-industrialisation a rallying cry, vowing to bring manufacturing back to American shores. Central to this vision is an aggressive use of tariffs – particularly against China – to protect U.S. industry. In 2018, President Donald Trump launched a trade war with China, slapping tariffs on roughly $370 billion of Chinese imports. This was an about-face from decades of U.S. free-trade policy and a much-needed wake-up call regarding China’s economic challenge. Trump was the first U.S. leader to seriously confront Beijing’s trade practices after years of offshoring and a “China shock” that had gutted American factories. However, while Trump’s tariff offensive was a necessary shock to the system, the MAGA movement’s continued over-reliance on tariffs – without a broader strategy – has proven inadequate. China has largely outmaneuvered these tariffs through clever rerouting of supply chains and loopholes. Meanwhile, Trump’s successor Joe Biden kept the tariffs in place but crucially augmented them with massive industrial investments – from green energy to semiconductors – that MAGA purists now ironically oppose. This article critically analyses MAGA’s tariff-centric approach to U.S. industrial revival, exposing its contradictions and arguing that a collaborative, pro-worker, pro-democracy re-industrialisation – not isolationism – is the only viable path to counter China.
Trump’s Tariff War – A Necessary Shock, But Not a Strategy
Trump’s trade war was born of real concerns. By the late 2010s, China had become a manufacturing superpower, accounting for nearly 30% of global manufacturing output – more than the U.S., Japan, and Germany combined. For decades, American policymakers largely tolerated this shift under a free-trade consensus while U.S. manufacturing withered. Between 1998 and 2010, the U.S. lost millions of factory jobs as companies moved production to China and other low-cost countries. The political backlash finally arrived in 2016, with Trump channeling the anger of deindustrialised communities. His tariffs in 2018-2019 marked a dramatic break from the past: suddenly, the world’s largest economy was willing to impose 10%, 25%, even 50% duties on imports to force a realignment. This tough approach was controversial – economists warned Americans would pay higher prices, and even Trump’s own party was divided – but it undeniably signaled to Beijing that the old status quo was over.
Trump’s tariffs, in effect, served as a “wake-up call” for the U.S. establishment. They drove home the point that laissez-faire wasn’t working in the face of China’s state-backed mercantilism. As Biden’s National Economic Council head Brian Deese later put it, “The Chinese model… relies on significant intervention with enormous subsidies and non-market practices… a purely laissez-faire approach doesn’t work”. In other words, Trump’s confrontational stance – however blunt – forced America to recognise that new strategies were needed to rebalance trade and rebuild industry. In this sense, Trump’s trade war was a necessary shock therapy, ending years of complacency. It created a rare bipartisan consensus that the U.S. must “counter China and make more things in America”, as one report noted. By 2020, even many Democrats accepted the need for tariffs or other measures to defend critical industries.
Yet, tariffs alone were never going to be a sufficient strategy. Trump’s trade war, though bold, was also scattershot and ad-hoc, implemented “haphazardly,” according to critics. It lacked a coherent industrial policy behind it. Tariffs can raise import costs, but they don’t automatically create factories at home – companies might just shift to other low-cost countries. Indeed, that’s exactly what happened: businesses found ways to circumvent the China duties rather than relocate production to the U.S. The tariffs were a blunt instrument, necessary for shaking up the debate, but insufficient for a true industrial revival. They needed to be part of a broader plan – something the MAGA approach was missing. Trump’s own former advisors have acknowledged that tariffs were only a first step and that the U.S. needed to follow up with investment and alliance-building – areas where the MAGA movement has been less interested.
In summary, Trump’s tariff offensive was historic and arguably overdue. It put China on notice and woke up Washington to the economic security threat. However, as we will see, the tariff-centric MAGA playbook has not delivered the promised manufacturing renaissance. Lacking complementary policies, it has been outflanked by Beijing, and ironically, it is now colliding with MAGA’s other ideological commitments (like opposing “big government” investment). The wake-up call was sounded; the question is what America does next – hit the snooze button with more slogans, or craft a smarter strategy?
Beijing Ducks and Dodges: How China Circumvented the Tariffs
If tariffs were supposed to bring China to its knees, Beijing clearly didn’t get the memo. Chinese firms and global supply networks proved remarkably adept at evading U.S. tariffs. Rather than capitulate, China rerouted its exports through third countries and exploited loopholes in U.S. trade rules – moves that blunted the impact of Trump’s measures.
One major end-run around tariffs was via third-country transshipment. Companies would ship Chinese-made goods to intermediate countries like Vietnam or Mexico, lightly alter or re-label them, and then export to the U.S. as if they were Vietnamese or Mexican products. This practice exploded after 2018. For example, Vietnam’s exports to the U.S. surged as Chinese manufacturers used it as a conduit. By 2022, Vietnam’s trade surplus with the U.S. hit $123 billion, growing “rapidly as companies moved there from China to skirt tariffs”. Analysts estimate that in the years after Trump’s tariffs, up to 7.5% of Vietnam’s exports to the U.S. were actually Chinese goods in disguise – amounting to billions of dollars in trade diverted from China’s ledgers but not actually reshored to America. The same occurred with Mexico: imports of certain electronics parts from Mexico jumped, while Mexico’s own imports of those parts from China rose in tandem. In short, China “laundered” exports through its neighbours. Factories popped up across Southeast Asia to finish or repackage Chinese components, all to dodge “Made in China” labels and U.S. duties. As one analysis put it, this “China wash” allowed Chinese supply chains to remain intact despite the tariffs.
Another giant loophole was the U.S. “de minimis” rule for small packages. Under U.S. law, imported packages valued under $800 enter duty-free, with no tariffs applied. This rule – originally meant to ease customs on low-value purchases – became a massive pipeline for Chinese e-commerce. Online retail platforms in China seized the opportunity to ship cheap goods directly to U.S. consumers in countless small parcels, each under the $800 threshold. The result was staggering: by 2022, the number of duty-free parcels exploded to 1.4 billion per year, and over 90% of all packages coming into the U.S. were de minimis shipments. Of those, about 60% came from China, largely from fast-fashion and bargain sites like Shein and Temu. These companies essentially turned Chinese factories into fulfillment centers for U.S. shoppers, shipping millions of items (clothing, electronics, trinkets) in individual packets that avoided tariffs entirely. Shein, for instance, could send a $10 dress from Guangzhou to a customer in California without incurring a dime of import tax. This undercut U.S. retailers and bypassed the tariff wall. Even more troubling, some traffickers exploited de minimis to ship illicit goods – a Reuters investigation found that Chinese chemical precursors for fentanyl were routed through the U.S. in small packages to evade detection. In effect, China found a crack in America’s trade defences and drove a 1.4-billion-package truck through it.
Beijing also diversified its supply chains to cushion the blow. Even as tariffs hit, China didn’t lose its manufacturing dominance – it simply shifted some production to friendly locales. Chinese-founded companies set up new factories in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, etc.), and Chinese exports of components to those countries rose. For example, shipments of Chinese-made solar panels to Vietnam and then from Vietnam to the U.S. skyrocketed after 2018. Chinese firms also started using Hong Kong and other trade hubs to relay goods. Shein, while still making most of its products in China, began adding suppliers in Vietnam, Brazil, and Turkey to hedge against U.S. import curbs. This global game of supply-chain whack-a-mole meant that even as direct U.S. imports from China fell for certain goods, imports from countries like Vietnam more than doubled since the tariffs went into effect. American consumers kept buying many of the same products; they just arrived via circuitous routes.
All of this highlights a key point: Tariffs alone cannot decouple complex supply chains in a globalised economy. China’s ecosystem is too entrenched. Faced with U.S. duties, it skillfully redirected the flow of goods rather than relinquishing manufacturing. Yes, Chinese exports to the U.S. in targeted categories did drop, but alternative suppliers (often linked to China) filled the void. U.S. importers frequently just paid the higher costs or shifted to Southeast Asian vendors, passing costs onto consumers. A recent U.S. government report found American importers, not Chinese exporters, bore most of the tariff costs in practice – meaning U.S. firms and shoppers paid the bill. Meanwhile, America’s overall trade deficit with the world didn’t markedly improve; it just got reshuffled. The tariffs were a finger in the dike of a $600+ billion annual goods deficit.
None of this is to say tariffs had zero effect – they did force some supply chain adjustments, and China can no longer assume unfettered access to the U.S. market. But the bottom line is that China largely circumvents one-country tariffs. As long as other nations are willing to serve as intermediaries and loopholes like de minimis exist, Beijing can keep its exports flowing while dodging the direct line of fire. This is a crucial reality that any effective strategy must recognise. MAGA’s tariff-only approach has been outfoxed by a globally networked China. Tariffs are a tool, but without additional tools, they become a game of whack-a-mole that the U.S. will inevitably lose.
Biden’s Industrial Policy: Tariffs Plus Investment – A New Game Plan
If Trump’s trade war was the stick, President Joe Biden added the carrots. Upon taking office in 2021, Biden faced a strategic choice: whether to unwind Trump’s tariffs or double down. Politically, removing the China tariffs was untenable (no one wanted to look “soft on China”), so Biden kept nearly all of Trump’s tariffs in place. More than two years into his term, those tariffs remained, despite quiet reviews and corporate lobbying to lift them. In effect, Biden validated Trump’s wake-up call – a remarkable continuity between two adversaries. However, Biden fundamentally expanded the approach by launching a broad-based industrial policy revival not seen in decades. While Trump fixated on tariffs alone, Biden paired tariffs with massive public investments and incentives to actually rebuild domestic manufacturing. The result is a fledgling strategy that might be called “tariffs + industrial policy”, as opposed to MAGA’s tariffs-alone playbook.
In 2022, Biden and Congress enacted the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), a landmark law that ploughs $369 billion into clean energy, electric vehicles (EVs), batteries, and other climate-related manufacturing and deployment. The IRA is the single largest investment in climate and energy in American history – but it’s also explicitly a jobs and industry bill aimed at onshoring the production of the technologies of the future. It provides generous tax credits for companies to build factories for EV batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, and more in the United States. It also gives consumers tax credits to buy American-made EVs and appliances, creating demand for U.S.-built products. At the same time, the CHIPS and Science Act was passed, allocating $52.7 billion for domestic semiconductor manufacturing and R&D, and the bipartisan Infrastructure Law (2021) authorized hundreds of billions for upgrading transport, power, and water systems, with strong Buy American rules. Together, these moves represent a new industrial policy trifecta – a deliberate effort to finance the growth of strategic industries at home, from silicon chips to EVs to clean energy. One analysis calls it a “triple whammy of innovation, investment, and industrial policy” that could catalyse trillions in private investment over the next decade.
Crucially, Biden’s approach kept the pressure on China (tariffs, export controls) while giving U.S. manufacturers the tools to compete. Rather than expecting tariffs alone to magically resurrect factories, the administration is using tariffs as part of a larger toolkit. For instance, with tariffs making Chinese imports costlier, the IRA’s subsidies make it more attractive for companies to choose America as a production base to serve the U.S. market. It’s the carrot-and-stick approach: discourage imports via tariffs and trade rules; encourage domestic and allied production via subsidies and partnerships. The early results are promising. Since the IRA’s passage, over 270 new clean energy and EV-related projects have been announced across the U.S., totalling nearly $114 billion in new investment. Over 80% of these projects are in manufacturing – from battery gigafactories in the Deep South to new solar panel plants in the Midwest. For example, a joint venture is investing $1.9 billion to build a battery plant in Mississippi. Intel broke ground on new chip fabs in Ohio (a $20 billion project) thanks to CHIPS Act support. Foreign automakers like Hyundai and BMW are racing to build EV assembly and battery facilities in states like Georgia and South Carolina, drawn by IRA incentives and the promise of a growing American EV market. In 2019, the U.S. had only 2 battery cell factories; by early 2025, about 34 battery plants are planned or under construction – a 17-fold increase in just a few years. This battery manufacturing boom was “a trickle that turned into a tsunami” after the pandemic, accelerated by the IRA’s generous credits for domestic battery production.
It’s not just green tech. The CHIPS Act incentives have lured Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung to build cutting-edge semiconductor fabs on U.S. soil. Dozens of smaller semiconductor and electronics supply-chain projects are underway – new circuit board factories, chip packaging facilities, and R&D centres. The U.S. hadn’t seen this scale of industrial investment in decades; now it’s becoming a reality. The Biden administration has effectively declared that economic security is national security and is backing that up with public dollars. This marks a sharp break from the free-market dogma of previous eras. Rather than just taxing imports (tariffs), the U.S. government is partnering with industry to finance capacity at home. It’s a page straight out of China’s playbook (state-guided development), adapted for a democratic market economy.
Significantly, Biden did not roll back Trump’s confrontational stance – he reinforced it in other ways. For instance, the administration implemented sweeping export controls on advanced chips and equipment to China and persuaded allies like the Netherlands and Japan to join, cutting off China’s access to the most advanced lithography machines and AI chips. This is a severe blow to China’s tech ambitions, achieved through coordination with allies (more on that later). Biden also kept a hard line on Chinese telecoms (5G bans) and pushed new rules to screen Chinese investments. In short, Biden matched Trump’s toughness on trade/tech (tariffs, bans, export controls) but added a whole new dimension with proactive industrial policy. As a result, the U.S. today has a more comprehensive economic strategy: protect and grow. Protect key sectors from predatory trade and grow domestic capacity in those sectors.
For the MAGA movement, however, Biden’s embrace of industrial policy poses an ideological contradiction. Trump and many on the right have lambasted Biden’s IRA and green investment as “socialist” or “big government” interference. Yet these investments are directly boosting U.S. manufacturing jobs, often in Republican-leaning states! Biden’s team consciously wrote the laws to favor factory-building in American heartland communities, many of which voted for Trump. It’s a bitter irony: MAGA’s stated goal is to revive manufacturing, but when that revival comes in the form of government-supported clean energy or semiconductor plants, MAGA politicians deride it. Nonetheless, the data doesn’t lie – the U.S. is seeing the first uptick in domestic manufacturing output and capacity in a generation, partly due to these policies. The industrial production of electronics, EVs, and machinery is rising. Factory construction in the U.S. hit record highs in 2023-2024, measured by expenditures – a sign of future capacity coming online. Biden essentially co-opted some of Trump’s rhetoric (“make it in America”) but delivered a mix of policies more effective than tariffs alone.
In summary, the Biden administration has treated Trump’s tariff agenda as the floor, not the ceiling. It maintained the tariff pressure as leveragebut crucially complemented it with large-scale public investment – from the IRA’s green manufacturing push to the CHIPS Act’s tech subsidies – that address the root capabilities gap. This dual approach acknowledges that you must both deter the bad (unfair imports) and spur the good (domestic production). Early signs indicate this strategy is bearing fruit in renewed factory activity. However, this is where the MAGA movement’s current trajectory becomes perplexing – because Trumpism 2.0 seems intent on dismantling many of these gains, as we examine next.
MAGA 2.0: Contradictions in Trump’s Industrial Vision
As Trump eyes a potential second term, he and his MAGA allies have laid out proposals that purport to supercharge American industry – yet many of these plans would undermine the very sectors they claim to champion. There is a glaring contradiction at the heart of MAGA’s current trade and industrial rhetoric. On one hand, they call for “bringing back our factories” and out-competing China; on the other hand, they vow to scrap Biden’s green industrial policies and tech investments, which are the very tools enabling a U.S. manufacturing comeback. It’s a case of slogans over strategy, and it risks turning the tariff offensive into an own-goal.
Consider the clean energy and EV sector, which is pivotal to future manufacturing. The MAGA right has routinely mocked EVs, renewable energy, and climate initiatives, painting them as elitist or detrimental to oil and gas jobs. Trump’s second-term agenda explicitly includes repealing or gutting the Inflation Reduction Act – he has derided it as the “Inflation Production Act” and promised to “rescind all unspent funds” under it, scrapping the subsidies for EVs, batteries, solar, etc. In January 2025, Trump (in a hypothetical scenario) even signed an executive order titled “Unleashing American Energy,” seeking to eliminate what he calls the “electric vehicle mandate”. He pledged to end EV purchase credits (the $7,500 tax credit for new EVs in Biden’s climate law), roll back emissions standards for cars, and revoke California’s waiver that enables stricter clean car rules. All of this would directly undercut America’s burgeoning EV and battery industry. Dozens of planned battery plants and EV assembly lines (worth tens of billions in investment) are premised on those IRA incentives and stricter future emission rules pushing automakers electric. Yanking the rug now would sow chaos: factories might be canceled or scaled back, companies could shift battery production abroad where incentives remain, and the U.S. would likely fall behind in the global EV race (which China currently leads in scale).
Similarly, in semiconductors, Trump-era MAGA rhetoric emphasises tariffs and trade punishment but is sceptical of government spending on industry. Reports indicate Trump has considered slashing the CHIPS Act subsidies or attaching so many strings that companies like TSMC pull out. A LinkedIn analysis of Trump’s 2025 semiconductor stance noted that he “signaled a potential reduction or elimination of these grants” for chip fabs, choosing instead to rely purely on tariffs to encourage domestic production. This alarms experts, who warn that “relying solely on tariffs may not achieve the desired outcome” and that **cutting grants while imposing tariffs could discourage the very investments in U.S. manufacturing that are needed. In other words, if Trump were to withdraw the subsidies that induced TSMC and Intel to build here, those fabs could stall – achieving the opposite of “bringing silicon manufacturing home.” It’s telling that even Taiwan’s TSMC has expressed concerns; they invested in Arizona on the expectation of stable U.S. support. A capricious reversal would send a terrible signal to global investors about America’s reliability.
Trump’s advisers have floated other ideas like a blanket 10% tariff on all imports from all countries (a “universal tariff”). While such a move fits the protectionist bent, it could also jack up costs for U.S. manufacturers who rely on imported inputs (many industries do), thereby making U.S. exports less competitive. Moreover, Trump’s trade approach in practice has often targeted allies, too. For instance, in a mooted second-term scenario, Trump slapped steep tariffs on Vietnam (46%), Malaysia (24%), Thailand (36%), and others in Southeast Asia – ostensibly to punish them for transshipping Chinese goods or for running trade surpluses. This heavy-handed, indiscriminate tariff barrage on friendly nations horrified U.S. businesses and diplomats. It threatens to collapse supply-chain cooperation with countries that America needs on its side (more on that in the next section). As one Southeast Asia expert observed, Trump’s unilateral coercive approach “undermines the trading system that countries in this region prospered under”. By treating all trade as a zero-sum battleground, MAGA’s extreme tariff plans risk isolating the U.S. economically, even from its allies.
The contradiction is stark: MAGA champions domestic industrial revival, yet would tear down nascent domestic industries (clean tech, EVs, advanced chips) due to an ideological aversion to “green” policies or government spending. It’s a self-defeating stance. You cannot MAGA–ify the economy while ignoring where the world is headed – toward electric vehicles, renewable energy, and high-tech manufacturing. These are exactly the sectors China is pouring investment into (Chinese EV makers and battery firms are now among the world’s largest). If America unilaterally disarms its own industry support in these fields, no amount of tariffs will bring back 1970s-era factories to make typewriters and gas guzzlers. The global market (and global regulations) are moving forward. Canceling the IRA and related efforts would forfeit America’s chance to lead in the industries of tomorrow, leaving that to Europe or China.
Furthermore, MAGA’s promise to restore coal and traditional manufacturing jobs, while appealing to nostalgia, does not align with where private capital is flowing. Even under Trump’s first term, despite tariffs, overall U.S. manufacturing employment barely grew (pre-pandemic), and sectors like coal continued to shed jobs. By contrast, the fastest growth in industrial jobs now is in EV battery plants, semiconductor fabs, and renewable equipment – many in red states. Ironically, MAGA’s own constituents are benefiting from the very investments their leaders scorn. This disconnect suggests that the movement is stuck in an outdated vision of industry (“bring back the old factories”) rather than embracing a future-oriented industrial strategy.
In sum, Trump’s second-term proposals reveal a hollow industrial strategy: big on protectionist bravado (tariffs everywhere) but actively hostile to the public investments and alliance-building needed for success. It is a recipe for stagnation and strategic failure – a Fortress America approach that would leave the U.S. both technologically and diplomatically isolated. To truly compete with China, the U.S. must compete in advanced industries and do so in concert with its allies. MAGA 2.0, as currently envisioned, would do neither. This contradiction – claiming to revive industry while dismantling industrial policy – is at the core of why MAGA’s approach falls short.
Europe and Allies Forge Their Own Green Industrial Strategies
While America debates tariffs vs. industrial policy, other Western countries are not standing still. Across the Atlantic, Europe has been crafting its own approach to reindustrialisation in the face of Chinese competition and the green transition. The European Union (EU), initially alarmed by Biden’s IRA (which EU leaders saw as diverting investment to the U.S.), responded by launching a “Green Deal Industrial Plan” in 2023. This plan aims to boost EU clean-tech manufacturing and secure supply chains, echoing many of the same goals as the U.S. strategy.
The EU’s approach, however, differs in style: where the U.S. IRA relies on massive tax incentives and subsidies (carrots for industry), the EU traditionally leaned more on regulatory tools and carbon pricing to drive change. For example, the EU’s Fit for 55 package includes a new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) – essentially a carbon tariff on imports like steel and cement from countries with lax emissions rules. This protects European industry from being undercut by dirtier, cheaper imports (many from China), and nudges global trade to factor in carbon costs. The EU also has aggressive fuel economy and emissions standards that effectively push automakers toward EVs, as well as an Emissions Trading System. However, recognising the need to keep up with the subsidy race, Brussels relaxed state-aid rules to allow European governments to pour money into battery factories, hydrogen projects, and microchip plants. The EU is channeling tens of billions of euros into these sectors via various funds – for instance, the EU Chips Act aims to mobilise €43 billion to double Europe’s share of global chip production by 2030. Likewise, Europe has a Battery Alliance initiative supporting dozens of gigafactory projects (Sweden’s Northvolt, France’s Verkor, Germany’s CATL plant, etc.) to make Europe largely self-sufficient in EV batteries in the coming decade.
Importantly, Europe is also emphasising “friend-shoring” and allied supply chain creation. European leaders openly talk about reducing dependence on China for critical inputs – whether it’s rare earth minerals for wind turbines, lithium for batteries, or pharmaceutical ingredients. The EU has sought new trade and investment agreements with resource-rich democracies. For instance, the EU struck a partnership with Canada to secure access to Canadian cobalt, lithium, and nickel (key battery materials) and is negotiating similar deals with Australia and African nations. There’s also a transatlantic element: the U.S. and EU in 2023 formed a taskforce to coordinate on critical minerals sourcing, so that minerals mined or processed in Europe can qualify for U.S. EV credits (and vice versa) – an attempt to create an integrated allied supply chain for EV batteries rather than each doing it alone. Europe’s recent outreach to the “Global South” also has a friend-shoring angle: the EU’s Global Gateway initiative is partly about investing in infrastructure in developing countries to offer alternatives to China’s Belt and Road while securing reliable supply relationships.
Beyond supply chains, Europe is bulking up its defensive trade tools as well. It has introduced a new mechanism to screen foreign (read: Chinese) subsidies in EU market acquisitions and is contemplating outbound investment controls similar to the U.S., to prevent European technology leakage to geopolitical rivals. The common thread is that the EU recognises it must act strategically to retain industrial competitiveness in a decarbonising world economy. As one policy analysis noted, a “virtuous cycle” of transatlantic green industrial policy could form an economic bloc that more effectively competes with China while bolstering Western industries. This hints at a convergence: despite differing methods, the U.S. and EU ultimately share the goal of revitalising domestic manufacturing, especially in clean and high-tech sectors, to ensure democracies, not autocracies, lead the 21st-century economy.
Allied countries in Asia are on similar paths. Japan has invested heavily in onshoring chip production (TSMC is building in Japan with government support) and in securing EV battery materials through partnerships in Southeast Asia. South Korea, which has world-leading battery and chip firms, is working with the U.S. (through the CHIPS Act and IRA provisions) to build factories in America, effectively integrating its supply chain with the U.S. for mutual benefit. Even smaller nations like Australia have unveiled strategies to move up the value chain (e.g., processing critical minerals domestically rather than just exporting raw ores to China). Meanwhile, alliances like the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia) have a working group on supply chain security, aiming to diversify sources for key products (pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, etc.). India is trying to attract manufacturing away from China by offering its own subsidies (e.g. phone assembly). In essence, a global realignment is underway: democracies are starting to knit together a new industrial ecosystem, driven by both geopolitical concerns (over-reliance on China) and the shift to green tech.
The EU, in particular, provides a useful counterpoint to MAGA’s approach. Europe is highly exposed to global trade (its economy is very open) and was initially wary of protectionism. But after experiencing supply crunches (e.g. PPE shortages in 2020, gas cut-offs by Russia in 2022) and witnessing America’s bold moves, the EU has embraced a form of “open strategic autonomy” – seeking autonomy in critical industries while staying open to trade with allies. This is essentially re-globalisation rather than de-globalisation: building new networks of trade and tech exchange among like-minded nations. Notably, Europe’s strategy is collaborative – EU nations pooling resources and the union seeking partnerships abroad – rather than each nation going it alone. The contrast with MAGA’s unilateral protectionism is clear.
Europe also understands the power of market size combined with values: by setting high standards (like carbon footprint requirements, data privacy, etc.), the EU can influence global business practices because companies want access to the EU market. When combined with the U.S. market via coordinated policies, this Western standard-setting can shape entire industries (for example, if both U.S. and EU demand lower-carbon steel, producers worldwide will adapt to meet those standards or lose those huge markets). This is a more sophisticated use of leverage than blanket tariffs on everyone.
In summary, other advanced economies are actively pursuing green-industrial strategies and allied supply chain initiatives that mirror many U.S. goals. The EU’s Green Deal Industrial Plan, Japan and Korea’s tech investments, India’s manufacturing push – all are pieces of a larger puzzle of like-minded nations trying to reduce dependence on China and create a secure industrial base for the future. Far from being “globalist” conspiracies, these efforts are about democratic countries regaining control over their economic destinies. They show that working with allies is not a weakness; it’s the way to amplify strength. This leads to the central argument: the U.S. cannot win this fight alone – and luckily, it doesn’t have to.
Re-Globalisation: Winning the Economic War With Allies, Not Against Them
If there is one takeaway from the past few years, it’s that no country can single-handedly decouple from China or rebuild full-spectrum industrial capacity on its own – not even a nation as large as the United States. China’s tentacles in global trade are deep and far-reaching. Trying to sever them unilaterally is like playing chess one versus many. The far smarter approach is a coordinated one: let the world’s democracies and trusted partners collectively reshape globalisation to favour friend-shoring over dependence on adversaries. This concept – call it “re-globalisation among friends” – is the only realistic path to reducing China’s leverage while maintaining the benefits of an interconnected economy.
What does this re-globalisation entail? First, friend-shoring supply chains: moving production of critical goods out of China into allied nations (or back home when feasible). This doesn’t mean everything must be made in America, but it should be made somewhere in the alliance of democracies. For example, if solar panels can be made competitively in Malaysia or Mexico instead of China, and those countries are security partners, that is a win for the broader coalition and still reduces reliance on China. Janet Yellen, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, has been a vocal proponent of “friend-shoring” – she describes it as “deepening relationships and diversifying supply chains with a greater number of trusted partners to lower risks for our economy”. In October 2023, Yellen reiterated that the U.S. wants a broad-based friend-shoring policy with many countries to avoid overdependence on China while preserving the benefits of trade. This philosophy recognises that completely domesticating every supply chain is impractical – but by ensuring key links are in the hands of friends (be it Vietnam for apparel, Mexico for auto parts, or Canada for minerals), the U.S. and its allies can collectively achieve resilience.
Second, coordinated export controls and tech sharing within the alliance. The U.S. proved this model with advanced semiconductors: Washington imposed strict export controls on chip technology to China in 2022, but the chokehold became truly effective only when the Netherlands and Japan agreed to align their controls (since they make essential lithography and semiconductor tools). This was a diplomatic victory – an example of allies coming together to restrict China’s access to critical tech, ensuring there were no major loopholes. Going forward, this template should extend to other sensitive areas: for instance, allied nations can jointly ban sales of certain AI software or aerospace components to China. At the same time, within the friend group, there should be tech sharing and co-investment: joint R&D projects, standardisation of regulations, perhaps even cross-country industrial planning (e.g. divvy up which country specialises in which chip type to avoid duplication and foster synergy). One concrete idea floated is a kind of “NATO for trade/tech” – a formal pact where members agree to both preferential trade amongst themselves and collective measures against non-members who violate fair trade. While politically complex, we already see mini-lateral examples: the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, the Quadrilateral (Quad) critical tech working group, and AUKUS (which, while mainly a defence pact, includes tech cooperation on submarines and quantum tech among the U.S., UK, and Australia).
Third, defence and intelligence cooperation underpins all this because economic security and national security are intertwined. An allied re-globalisation means not only making things together but also protecting them together. This could entail coordinating cybersecurity to protect supply chains from sabotage, sharing intelligence on China’s attempts to infiltrate or influence industries, and aligning defence procurement so that allied militaries rely on each other’s industrial bases rather than on China. For instance, the U.S. might source rare earth magnets for missiles from Australian or European companies instead of Chinese ones, even if that means paying more – because allies will stand by you in war, whereas Beijing could be an adversary. Five Eyes intelligence sharing (U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) has already expanded to economic arenas, like warning about Chinese IP theft in industries. The more the democracies trust each other with sensitive intel, the more they can confidently collaborate on industrial projects without fear of espionage. In essence, trusted networks are being built to encircle and contain the influence of untrusted states in supply chains.
Critically, this collective approach has an important feature: it is inclusive of many countries, large and small, provided they share basic principles (market-based, transparent, rule-of-law economies). It’s not just “America and everyone else be damned.” That MAGA-style isolationism is not only counter-productive, it’s unnecessary. The U.S. has willing partners from Europe to Asia to the Americas who also want to reduce dependency on China. By working together, they can each specialise and contribute – perhaps one country provides raw materials, another provides manufacturing, another provides R&D, and all ensure the supply lines between them are secure and free from coercion. This “ally-shoring” concept was well articulated by Canadian Chamber of Commerce CEO Perrin Beatty, who said in 2023: “We’ve learned that many issues can’t be resolved by countries acting alone. ... The globalisation of the late 20th century is a thing of the past. We’re seeing that political alliances are reshaping the nature of the global economy.”. In other words, geopolitics and economics are now fused, and like-minded nations must band together. Beatty’s emphasis on alliances echoes what many strategists argue: decoupling from China will work only if it is a multi-country decoupling that reroutes trade and investment to an alliance network rather than attempting to collapse global trade entirely.
The alternative – trying to go it alone – would not only strain U.S. consumers and companies (with higher costs and limited alternatives), but it would also likely fail to isolate China. If the U.S. acted solo, China would continue trading and collaborating with Europe, Asia, etc., perhaps even driving a wedge between the U.S. and others by offering carrots to those who break from an American hard line. We already saw some of this in Trump’s first term: his tariffs on allies like the EU (steel/aluminum tariffs) and threats against auto exports alienated partners. Allied capitals bristled at Washington’s unpredictability. Some sought greater ties with China as a hedge. Trump’s trade wars with everyone at once risked leaving America isolated, not China. By contrast, the Biden-era approach of coordinating with allies on targeted China-focused measures has kept the coalition largely intact. A key example is how U.S. support for European energy security (like exporting LNG to replace Russian gas) won goodwill, making Europeans more willing to join U.S. initiatives on China. It’s the classic concept of an alliance: you have my back, and I have yours. MAGA’s isolationism forgets that the U.S. is stronger with friends.
To win a strategic competition with a peer like China, the U.S. and its allies represent a far larger combined market and technological base. The G7 countries plus partners still account for well over half of global GDP – a fact that is sometimes lost amidst talk of China’s rise. If that economic clout is marshaled in a unified way, it can set standards, drive innovation, and deny adversaries critical inputs effectively. For instance, if the U.S., EU, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan coordinate, they basically control all cutting-edge semiconductor production. If those same nations, plus Australia, Canada, and others, coordinate on critical minerals, they can form a supply chain from mine to market that bypasses China entirely. Decoupling then becomes a managed process of re-routing trade rather than severing trade. It’s not decoupling from the world, it’s decoupling from China and other hostile actors by re-coupling with allies.
In practical terms, this allied approach is already yielding results: we discussed how Japanese and Dutch cooperation on chip export bans is constraining China’s tech ascent. On the flip side, North America’s friend-shoring is drawing industries from China to Mexico (like automotive), where integrated U.S.-Mexico supply chains can flourish under USMCA trade rules. The U.S. is working with India on shifting some electronics manufacturing there (Apple now assembles a small share of iPhones in India, reducing reliance on China). A coalition effort is visible in defence tech too: Britain and Japan joined the U.S. on a next-gen fighter jet project – again, pooling expertise to counter China. These examples show a prototype of a new geopolitical economy: call it the “alliance economy” or an “Economic NATO,” where members collectively support each other’s industries and collectively deny strategic advantages to rivals.
It must be stressed that this strategy is not about creating an autarkic West or a rigid Cold War bloc. Allied countries will still trade with China in non-sensitive areas; decoupling is meant for strategic sectors (like tech, defence-related, energy infrastructure, etc.). The goal is not to end global trade but to filter it – keep trade open among rule-following nations but restrict it where it empowers aggressors or undermines our own industries and workers. You might say it’s globalisation with guardrails.
The MAGA movement’s error is thinking the U.S. can bully its way to industrial supremacy by pulling up the drawbridge. That won’t work in a world where supply chains are spiderwebbed across continents. A better image is building a new bridge – one that links Washington to Brussels to Tokyo to Canberra to New Delhi – while selectively cutting the bridge to Beijing where necessary. The U.S. cannot and need not fight a trade war alone; it should fight alongside its allies in a coordinated economic defence. That is how you actually reduce dependence on China and ensure that our side emerges stronger.
MAGA’s Isolationism: Slogans vs. Strategy
Having surveyed the landscape, it becomes evident that the MAGA movement’s isolationist approach is ultimately self-defeating. Its reflexive stance – tariffs on everyone, distrust of allies, and disdain for multilateral cooperation – is a poor fit for the modern economic battleground. While it markets itself as “America First,” in practice, it can leave America by itself, which is a losing position against a behemoth like China.
The shortcomings of MAGA’s trade nationalism can be encapsulated as follows:
It alienates allies and partners. By treating even friends as foes in trade, MAGA policies undermine the very coalitions needed to pressure China. Trump’s tariff threats against Canada, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and others during his term sowed distrust. For example, slapping tariffs on European steel and aluminum in the name of “national security” deeply offended EU nations (who pointed out they’ve been U.S. security allies for decades). Likewise, punishing Vietnam and other pro-U.S. Asian economies with huge tariffs (46% on Vietnam, etc.) for being manufacturing hubs not only damages those economies but also pushes them closer to China out of necessity. A Southeast Asian analyst warned that Trump’s unilateral coercion “undermines the trading system” in the region and erodes America’s reputation as a reliable partner. Indeed, China has been quick to woo these countries when the U.S. fumbles – offering them trade deals and investments and portraying itself as the “steadfast partner” contrasted with an erratic America. In strategic terms, MAGA’s approach tends to isolate the United States rather than China, doing Beijing’s work for it by driving wedges between the U.S. and others.
It misreads the global economic structure. MAGA rhetoric often imagines a world where factories can simply pop back up in Ohio or Michigan once imports are cut off. In reality, global supply chains are complex and don’t respond on a dime to border taxes. Decades of offshoring can’t be undone by tariffs alone – you need skills, capital, suppliers, and infrastructure rebuilt domestically, which takes time and smart policy. When Trump’s tariffs hit, we saw many manufacturers did not return to the U.S.; instead, they shifted to other countries or paid the tariff. A U.S. speaker manufacturer candidly admitted that the tariffs “caused us to move some of our products to China” (to finish assembly) to keep costs down – the opposite of the intended effect. He said if tariffs ended, they’d bring stuff back to the U.S., but as is, they were just becoming less competitive. This underscores that without complementary measures, tariffs can backfire or lead to unintended outcomes like increased offshoring in some cases. It’s a blunt tool that, if overused, can hurt American firms (who pay tariffs on inputs) and consumers (facing higher prices) without achieving reshoring. The MAGA approach of all stick and no carrot is basically pushing on a string economically.
It ignores the importance of innovation and adaptation. True industrial revival isn’t about recreating the past, it’s about investing in the future. MAGA’s promise to revive coal mining or bring back bygone industries fails to acknowledge that many such jobs were lost to technology or market shifts, not just trade. No tariff can bring back 1970s assembly line jobs if automation has replaced them or if the product is obsolete. A forward-looking strategy invests in new industries and skills for workers. Yet MAGA populism often shuns things like clean energy or advanced tech as elitist or irrelevant. By doing so, it risks stranding its own working-class base with declining opportunities. In contrast, a strategic industrial policy can create new blue-collar jobs (e.g. battery plant technicians, wind turbine assembly, and semiconductor equipment maintenance – many of which are good-paying, manufacturing-adjacent jobs accessible with community college training). It’s telling that many labour unions support the IRA and infrastructure plans because they see job growth there, whereas Trump’s vaguer promises of bringing back the past rang hollow after four years. The data shows manufacturing employment rose more rapidly in 2021-2023 (post-IRA, etc.) than it did pre-pandemic, and a lot of that is due to new investment. The MAGA approach, by contrast, offers plenty of slogans (“make America great again”) but little in the way of detailed plans to actually equip the American workforce for future industries.
It prioritises protectionism over competitiveness. Tariffs can protect a domestic industry up to a point, but without competition and innovation, that industry can stagnate. A shield can become a crutch. The MAGA worldview often seems to favour permanent high protection – but that doesn’t necessarily lead to world-beating industries; it can lead to complacency and higher costs. A good example is U.S. Steel: Trump’s tariffs gave steel mills a short-term boost, but with no requirement to modernise, some companies simply enjoyed higher profits while users of steel (auto, machinery industries) paid more, potentially making them less competitive globally. A smarter approach would pair protection with requirements or incentives to upgrade technology and productivity so that the industry can stand on its own. MAGA’s blunt protectionism lacks those nuances. Similarly, their disdain for environmental or labour standards (seen as “bureaucratic obstacles”) could undercut long-term competitiveness – modern industries benefit from consistent regulations and skilled labour. A strategy obsessed solely with raising import barriers misses the bigger picture of why certain industries left or fell behind. Often, it was because foreign competitors innovated faster or received strategic support at home. Answering that requires more than shouting “America First”; it requires planned investment, education, and yes, cooperation with others to set fair rules.
Ultimately, MAGA’s isolationism is hollow because it offers no viable path to actually achieving industrial dominance or security. It’s a feel-good mirage to say “we’ll slap tariffs on everyone and magically bring back jobs,” but without deeper strategy, it’s just that – a mirage. Worse, it can do tangible harm: higher consumer prices, retaliatory tariffs hitting U.S. exports (remember, China retaliated with tariffs on U.S. agriculture, hurting farmers badly until subsidies bailed them out), and the alienation of allies leading to a less secure world. The contradictions in MAGA rhetoric – praising American workers but opposing measures that actually help those workers compete globally; denouncing China but withdrawing from alliances needed to constrain China – are laid bare when one scrutinises the results.
By contrast, the collaborative approach we’ve outlined is both pro-worker and pro-democracy in a substantive way. It’s pro-worker because it aims to create high-quality manufacturing jobs in the industries of the future and ensure workers aren’t undercut by slave labour or environmental dumping in China. Coordinated action on trade can also enforce labour standards – for instance, an allied agreement might insist that goods imported into the bloc meet certain minimum wage or environmental criteria, which lifts conditions for workers globally. It’s pro-democracy because it explicitly links economic strength with the strength of democratic alliances – recognising that maintaining a free and open international order requires like-minded nations to be economically strong and interdependent, not economically feeble and fractious.
MAGA populists often speak as if “globalism” is the enemy of the American worker. In truth, unchecked globalisation under authoritarian influence is the enemy. The answer is not naive globalism, nor is it myopic nationalism – it is principled, cooperative global realignment. That means working with democratic allies to rewrite the rules in favour of our workers and against exploitative regimes. It means forming a united front to ensure the 21st century is shaped by democracies and not by autocratic powers. Tariffs have a role in that toolbox, but only alongside many other tools.
Conclusion: A Collaborative Path to Industrial Revival
The challenge of reviving American manufacturing in an age of Chinese dominance is immense but not insurmountable. The MAGA movement deserves credit for loudly ringing the alarm bell – after decades of complacency, the U.S. needed that jolt. Trump’s tariffs forced a reckoning that free trade with a mercantilist China had failed many American communities. However, as we’ve seen, tariffs alone are a blunt and leaky bucket; China adeptly diverted trade through third parties and exploited loopholes, dulling their impact. It took the next step – Biden’s embrace of industrial policy – to begin filling the bucket with real water: new factories, new jobs, renewed capacity.
Now, America stands at a crossroads. One path, favored by MAGA hardliners, is to double down on an isolationist tariff regime, even if it means abandoning the very industrial resurgence that’s underway (by scrapping green and tech investments) and alienating allies with all-against-all trade wars. This path leads to a fortress with cracks in the foundation – an America that walls itself off but finds the world (and China) moving on without it. It’s a path of short-term chest-thumping and long-term strategic decline.
The other path is a collaborative, strategic re-industrialisation: keep the pressure on China, yes, but do it smartly with our friends; invest in our workers and advanced industries; build an international economic order that rewards fair play and punishes cheating – in unison with others who share our democratic values. This path leverages America’s greatest assets: its network of alliances (a legacy of generations of statecraft), its entrepreneurial economy, and its tradition of innovation. It means sometimes accepting that a factory in Mexico or Canada – under a fair trade agreement – can be part of “bringing jobs back” if it strengthens North American competitiveness and reduces reliance on China. It means recognising that a unionised worker building an electric school bus in South Carolina thanks to an IRA subsidy is just as much a hero of American industrial revival as a steelworker in Pennsylvania protected by a tariff. The goal is to make sure millions more such jobs are created, and that they endure.
A pro-worker, pro-democracy industrial policy would thus entail: heavy investment in education and apprenticeships so Americans can fill skilled manufacturing roles; strong labour standards so that new factories provide good wages and conditions (the IRA, notably, ties extra incentives to projects with high labour standards); and trade agreements among democracies that uphold these standards so that we’re not undercut by a race to the bottom. It also means public-private coordination – something anathema to laissez-faire purists but proven effective by history (from WWII production to the space race).
We should be blunt: MAGA’s simplistic solutions aren’t enough and, in some cases, would hurt the cause. The world is more complicated than a campaign chant. Rebuilding industrial strength is slow, detailed work – it requires blueprints, not just bullhorns. Fortunately, there is emerging consensus across much of the political spectrum (outside the MAGA fringe) that the U.S. must both protect and build – using targeted protection where needed but also investing in infrastructure, innovation, and alliances. Biden’s continuation of Trump’s tariffs alongside huge domestic investment indicates a nascent bipartisan synthesis (even if neither side admits it): a recognition that we need a new kind of industrial statecraft.
For Atlantic nations – Europe and America – this is a moment of convergence after years of tension. Europe sees the need to get tougher; America sees the need to get smarter. The Atlantic drift of past years (when the U.S. and EU were at odds over trade) can be corrected by a shared mission: securing the economic foundations of democracy. If done right, what emerges could be a new golden era of Western industrial prowess – cleaner, more high-tech, more inclusive – in which manufacturing jobs once again provide a ladder to the middle class and technological leadership stays in the hands of open societies.
In closing, the MAGA movement tapped into real grievances and justifiably pointed out China’s abusive trade practices. But its answer – a tariff wall and go it alone – is a dead-end. The more promising answer is unfolding in real time: an America that still wields tariffs and trade enforcement but pairs them with ambitious investment at home and alliance-building abroad. That is how you truly Make America Competitive Again. It’s not as rhetorically simple as “tariffs good, globalism bad.” It’s a strategy – one that is nuanced, adaptive, and rooted in partnership. And as history shows, when America leads with its allies, there is little it cannot accomplish – on the factory floor as much as on the battlefield.